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INTRODUCTION
Do fertility rates converging by class reframe the debate about public
support for parents and family care?
The debate about support for child-rearing in the United States has long
foundered on the race and class divide. Since the Industrial Revolution,
fertility has diverged by class with the well-off choosing to have fewer
children while the working class has continued to have larger families.1
* Professor of Law and International Affairs, Penn State Law. This Essay was prepared for
the Symposium entitled The Law of Parents and Parenting, hosted by the Fordham Law
Review on November 5, 2021, at Fordham University School of Law.
** Justice Anthony M. Kennedy Distinguished Professor of Law; Nancy L. Buc ’69 Research
Professor in Democracy and Equity, University of Virginia School of Law.
*** Robina Chair in Law, Science and Technology, University of Minnesota Law School.
Thank you to Glenn Cohen, Michele Goodwin, and the 2022 Baby Markets Roundtable
participants for comments, and thanks to the Fordham Law Review for sponsoring the
Symposium at which this was first presented.
1. See, e.g., LINDA HIRSHMAN & JANE LARSON, HARD BARGAINS: THE POLITICS OF SEX
92 (1998); Jane Larson, “Women Understand So Little, They Call My Good Nature ‘Deceit’”:
A Feminist Rethinking of Seduction, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 374, 392 (1993) (stating that the
average number of children per family fell by approximately half between 1800 and 1900);
Martha J. Bailey & Brad J. Hershbein, U.S. Fertility Rates and Childbearing, 1800 to 2010,
at 2 (Sept. 2015) (draft manuscript), http://www-personal.umich.edu/~baileymj/
OUP_fertility_9_30_15.pdf [https://perma.cc/J3FL-VE4E] (“The standard fertility rate
timeseries . . . shows that American women reaching childbearing age around 1800 averaged
around seven to eight live births during their reproductive years and that this number fell to
between two and three children by 1930.”). Figure 2 shows that the huge decline (more than
half of the initial rate) occurred between 1855 and 1900—that is, after the beginning of the
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Starting in the 1990s, the rates of unintended pregnancy diverged
dramatically. Those who were 200 percent or more above the poverty line
cut their unintended pregnancies rate in half, while those below the poverty
line saw a substantial increase in the rates of unintended pregnancy,2
increasing the perceptions of “irresponsible reproduction.”3
The moment for family law convergence is at hand—and the reason is a
remarkable convergence in fertility rates. As this Essay shows, the fertility
discourse of the last half century deals with the profound effects that come
from the transformation of the economy and the place of modern families
within it. Discussions of race and class have been an important—and, often,
pernicious—part of a transformation in family values, as the
upper-middle-class efforts to channel ever greater investment into children
have increased economic inequality and contributed to racial, ideological,
and gender division. We see the convergence in fertility rates as an indication
that, at a practical level, a much larger part of the country is embracing the
new family ethos we have labeled “blue”—that is, postponement in
childbearing that facilitates greater investment in both men’s and women’s
earning capacity. This ethos, at its core, accepts women’s critical role as
wage earners and calls attention to the fact that societies cannot adequately
support child-rearing without remaking the public infrastructure that supports
family planning and care. Cultural values in the new regime reflect not just
“family values” but also the larger demographic and economic trends that are
remaking our society.
The modern story of family divergence—and of the “welfare queen”
stereotype4—starts with the 1965 Moynihan Report, which described the
increasing Black nonmarital birth rate as the result of a “tangle of
pathology.”5 Later sociologists, with much less fanfare, described the results
as the product of diverging fertility rates: married African Americans

industrialization. Id.; Gretchen Livingston, Family Size Among Mothers (May 7, 2015),
https://www.pewresearch.org/social-trends/2015/05/07/family-size-among-mothers/
[https://perma.cc/4MXH-TU4A] (“The more education a mother has, the fewer children she
will have on average in her lifetime”). On the class divide, see Michael R. Haines, The
Population of the United States, 1790–1920 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Historical Working
Paper No. 56, 1994), https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/h0056/h0056.pdf
[https://perma.cc/VZ5E-HKS2].
2. GUTTMACHER INST., UNINTENDED PREGNANCY IN THE UNITED STATES (2019),
https://www.guttmacher.org/sites/default/files/factsheet/fb-unintended-pregnancy-us.pdf
[https://perma.cc/YP8E-WH2P].
3. See generally Linda C. McClain, “Irresponsible” Reproduction, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 339
(1996).
4. Catherine Powell & Camille Gear Rich, The “Welfare Queen” Goes to the Polls:
Race-Based Fractures in Gender Politics and Opportunities for Intersectional Coalitions, 108
GEO. L.J. 105, 116 (2020).
5. See OFF. OF POL’Y PLAN. & RSCH., U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, THE NEGRO FAMILY:
THE CASE FOR NATIONAL ACTION (1965) [hereinafter THE MOYNIHAN REPORT],
https://web.stanford.edu/~mrosenfe/Moynihan%27s%20The%20Negro%20Family.pdf
[https://perma.cc/UPP9-T596].
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embraced contraception earlier than unmarried women, contributing to a
change in the population having children.6
A second divergence underlies differences between those who support
immigration and those who do not, based in part on the latter’s perception
that white people will soon be a minority within the United States.7
Underlying this perception is not just increased immigration, but high birth
rates among Latinx mothers. Latinx immigrants to the United States in fact
have had higher fertility rates than Americans (including Latinx Americans)
born in the United States.8 Their birth rates have also been higher than the
women in their home countries who did not emigrate.9 By 2019, white
people constituted less than 50 percent of children under the age of fifteen in
the United States.10 In addition, while 14 percent of the U.S. population was
foreign-born in 2017, 23 percent of all births were to immigrant women.11
The high birth rates among Latinx mothers were a principal reason why
overall U.S. population growth remained above replacement (that is, the U.S.
fertility rate remained above 2.1 children for every woman of childbearing
age), making the United States an outlier among developed countries.12
A third divergence involves class-based change in family formation.
Demographers described a “second demographic transition” led by the
developed world, characterized by falling overall fertility, a greater variety
of household living arrangements, and a disconnection between marriage and
reproduction.13 In the United States, conservative critics link these patterns
to moral decay.14 Underlying the class-based divergences was an increased
divergence in fertility timing. The average age of marriage and first birth for

6. See infra notes 53–58 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 79–83 and accompanying text.
8. Gretchen Livingston, Hispanic Women No Longer Account for the Majority of
Immigrant Births in the U.S., PEW RSCH. CTR. (Aug. 8, 2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/
fact-tank/2019/08/08/hispanic-women-no-longer-account-for-the-majority-of-immigrantbirths-in-the-u-s/ [https://perma.cc/R8W9-3LX7].
9. STEVEN A. CAMAROTA, CTR. FOR IMMIGR. STUD., BIRTH RATES AMONG IMMIGRANTS
IN AMERICA COMPARING FERTILITY IN THE U.S. AND HOME COUNTRIES (2005), https://cis.org/
sites/cis.org/files/articles/2005/back1105.pdf [https://perma.cc/KA3A-FWGJ] (finding that
immigrants have higher birth rates than women in their home countries).
10. William H. Frey, Less than Half of US Children Under 15 Are White, Census Shows,
BROOKINGS INST. (June 24, 2019), https://www.brookings.edu/research/less-than-half-of-uschildren-under-15-are-white-census-shows/ [https://perma.cc/423L-SG6Q].
11. See Livingston, supra note 8.
12. In 1990, for example, American women had 2.1 children each compared to 1.4 in
Spain and 1.5 in Germany. Caroline Sten Hartnett, US Fertility Is Dropping. Here’s Why
Some Experts Saw It Coming, THE CONVERSATION (May 30, 2018),
https://theconversation.com/us-fertility-is-dropping-heres-why-some-experts-saw-it-coming97037 [https://perma.cc/B9KC-CQ3L].
13. See Ron Lesthaeghe, The Second Demographic Transition: A Concise Overview of
Its Development, 111 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCIS. 18,112, 18,112–15 (2014) (comparing recent
global declines in fertility with the “first demographic transition” that followed
industrialization).
14. See generally Linda C. McClain, The Other Marriage Equality Problem, 93 B.U. L.
REV. 921 (2013) (summarizing this debate and how it relates to the second demographic
transition).
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college graduates steadily increased.15 A later age of marriage lowered
divorce rates, partly because of couples’ greater maturity and partly because
of assortative mating—those who waited longer to marry invested more in
their careers and became more likely to marry similarly successful partners.16
During the same period, the average age of first birth for women who did not
attend college remained the same.17 These changing fertility patterns
contributed to a class divide that, over time, also became a cultural divide.
The most economically prosperous and liberal areas of the country
increasingly had lower overall fertility, less divorce, fewer teen births, and
later ages of family formation than less prosperous (and more religious and
conservative) areas of the country.18 The legal rift that followed has been
described as a clash between “red families” and “blue families.”19
These differences in fertility patterns and management are now shrinking.
Beginning with the Great Recession in 2008, fertility rates began to drop,
driven to a large degree by changes in fertility for younger, poorer, and
minority women.20 They fell across the board for single, non-cohabiting
women of all races. Rates have dropped dramatically for teens of all races,
particularly Latinx teenagers.21 And the unintended pregnancy rates of
15. See KAY HYMOWITZ ET AL., KNOT YET: THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF DELAYED
MARRIAGE IN AMERICA 8 fig.IIA (2013), http://nationalmarriageproject.org/wp-content/
uploads/2013/03/KnotYet-FinalForWeb.pdf [https://perma.cc/6XC7-YQYT].
16. See Christine R. Schwartz, Trends and Variation in Assortative Mating: Causes and
Consequences, 39 ANN. REV. SOCIO. 451, 460 (2013) (noting an increase in educational
homogamy).
17. See HYMOWITZ ET AL., supra note 15.
18. NAOMI CAHN & JUNE CARBONE, RED FAMILIES V. BLUE FAMILIES: LEGAL
POLARIZATION AND THE CREATION OF CULTURE 2 (2010) (describing how family patterns
correlate with different cultures in different parts of the United States and contribute to a
divergence in family law doctrines regarding abortion, contraception, and custody). In
discussing socioeconomic status, differences in family practices tend to correspond to
educational differences, with college graduates adopting distinctly different patterns,
including delayed marriage and childbearing and lower divorce rates, than high-school-only
graduates. Id. at 39–40. In this Essay, we will accordingly use education as a marker of
socioeconomic status.
19. Id. at ii, 1–2.
20. Lyman Stone, Baby Bust: Fertility Is Declining the Most Among Minority Women,
INST. FOR FAM. STUD. (May 16, 2018), https://ifstudies.org/blog/baby-bust-fertility-isdeclining-the-most-among-minority-women [https://perma.cc/LTN4-6UDY] (finding an
overall American fertility rate of 1.76 per woman, the lowest in forty years, led by declining
fertility rates among minority women).
21. The modern high for teen births came at the height of the baby boom in 1957, reaching
96.3 births per 1000 girls between the ages of fifteen and nineteen, falling to 61.8 by 1991,
and then falling from 40.2 in 2008 to 16.7 by 2019. Amanda Barroso, With a Potential ‘Baby
Bust’ on the Horizon, Key Facts About Fertility in the U.S. Before the Pandemic, PEW RSCH.
CTR. (May 7, 2021), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2021/05/07/with-a-potentialbaby-bust-on-the-horizon-key-facts-about-fertility-in-the-u-s-before-the-pandemic/
[https://perma.cc/9MRL-ZP9T]. In 1991, the birth rates for teenagers (ages 15–19) of all races
was 61.8, while it was 16.7 in 2019. From 1991 to 2019, the birth rates for Latinx teenagers
dropped from 104.6 to 25.3 and the birth rates for non-Latinx Black teenagers dropped from
118.2 to 25.8. See John Elfein, Birth Rates Among U.S. Teenagers Aged 15–19 in Selected
Years Between 1991 and 2019, by Ethnicity, STATISTA (Apr. 23, 2021),
https://www.statista.com/statistics/222251/birth-rates-among-us-teenagers-aged-18-19-byethnic-origin/ [https://perma.cc/LV7D-8AB6]; MARTA ALVIRA-HAMMOND, NAT’L RSCH. CTR.
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women below the poverty line, which had increased substantially from the
mid-nineties to the mid-aughts, dropped.22 In recent decades, women with a
college degree or higher have seen their fertility rates rise.23 As a result,
looking at completed fertility—that is, the total number of children born to
each woman by the age of forty-four—educational differences have shrunk.24
These fertility shifts persisted through the post-2008 recovery25 and seem to
have been exacerbated during the pandemic, setting the stage for a greater
convergence in family patterns across race, region, and immigration status.26
They also have laid the foundation for a new era of family law.
Family support from adoption of the Aid to Dependent Children program
in the 1930s to the abolition of “welfare as we know it” in 1996 has been
integral to a debate about “‘irresponsible’ reproduction.”27 “Family caps,”
policies that deny benefits for additional children born to mothers on public
assistance, were designed to remove what supporters saw as the “perverse
incentive for welfare mothers to have more babies in order to get money.”28
In contrast, the adoption of European family allowances were often tied to
pronatalist policies designed at least in part to encourage greater fertility.29
Converging (and declining) fertility rates may increase political support for
ON HISPANIC CHILDREN & FAMILIES, HISPANIC
DECLINE IN THE U.S. FERTILITY RATE (2019),

WOMEN ARE HELPING DRIVE THE RECENT
https://www.hispanicresearchcenter.org/wpcontent/uploads/2019/08/Hispanic-fertility-trends-1989-20171.pdf [https://perma.cc/T9DG8LP5] (finding that for Hispanic women, the “fertility rate fell by 31 percent from 2006 to
2017, compared to 5 percent for white women and 11 percent for black women”); see also
BRADY E. HAMILTON, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, STATE TEEN BIRTH RATES
BY RACE AND HISPANIC ORIGIN:
UNITED STATES, 2017–2018, at 2 (2020), https://
www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr69/NVSR69-6-508.pdf [https://perma.cc/SZ6N-872U].
22. See GUTTMACHER INST., supra note 2.
23. BRADY E. HAMILTON, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, TOTAL FERTILITY
RATES, BY MATERNAL EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT AND RACE AND HISPANIC ORIGIN: UNITED
STATES, 2019, at 1, 5 (2021), https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr70/nvsr70-05-508.pdf
[https://perma.cc/L4VB-5MEK] (showing that in 2019 fertility rates continued to rise for
women with a bachelor’s degree through a doctorate or professional degree while continuing
to decline for others); see also Barroso, supra note 21.
24. In 2020, 80 percent of women with PhDs or professional degrees had children by the
age of forty-four, in comparison to 88 percent of women with a high school degree or less. In
1994, in contrast, only 65 percent of women with PhDs or professional degrees had children
compared to 88 percent of women with high school degrees or less. See Barroso, supra note
21.
25. Id. (observing that these changes were in place before the COVID-19 pandemic, which
may further lower overall U.S. fertility rates).
26. See HAMILTON, supra note 23 (birth rates for 2019); JOYCE A. MARTIN ET AL., BIRTHS
IN THE UNITED STATES, 2020 (2021), https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/databriefs/db418.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8U2L-XWEK] (showing a decline in general fertility rate from 2019–2020,
with decreases for non-Hispanic white, non-Hispanic Black, and Latinx women as well as for
all age groups).
27. McClain, supra note 3, at 340.
28. Barbara Vobejda & Judith Havemann, Doing the Math on the Welfare “Family Cap,”
WASH. POST (Mar. 30, 1997), https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/special/
welfare/stories/wf033097.htm [https://perma.cc/Y4UA-7JJF].
29. Leslie King, Demographic Trends, Pronatalism, and Nationalist Ideologies in the
Late Twentieth Century, ETHNIC & RACIAL STUD., May 2002, at 367, 372 (observing that
“[m]ost Western European countries have generous family benefits that were, prior to WWII,
at least partially attached to pronatalist agendas”).
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investing more in all families; the role of children in our society has changed
from matters of individual family values to the foundation for liberal
democracies.30
The other change is among well-educated women, with Black women
leading the way. Black married women have had substantially lower fertility
rates than white married women since the 1980s.31 And the birth rates for
unmarried Black women dropped sharply after 1969, while the birth rates for
unmarried white women increased, dramatically reducing the difference
between the two.32
Both Black and white college graduate nonmarital birth rates are
increasing.33 In recent years, white college graduate birth rates have also
increased, both within and outside of marriage. These changes may reflect
both changing economic conditions and women’s attitudes toward their
biological clocks. The willingness to have children, alone if necessary, has
become a sign of success rather than a sign of economic disadvantage.
This Essay examines how the convergence of fertility trends is likely to
reset the debate about state support for child-rearing, against the background
of an ongoing national conversation on supporting children and families,
prompted most recently by the COVID-19 pandemic.34 First, it reviews how
past failures to embrace such polices often foundered on diverging fertility
patterns and how this time may be different. Second, it considers how the
changing patterns among well-educated women may affect traditional family
law doctrines underlying custody and support. Third, it explores the
relationship between immigration, xenophobic backlash, and fertility rates,
considering whether these factors may change with converging fertility rates.
Finally, it considers the implications of the foregoing for family law.

30. See LINDA C. MCCLAIN, THE PLACE OF FAMILIES: FOSTERING CAPACITY, EQUALITY,
RESPONSIBILITY 155–90 (2006) (arguing that childhood investment is a matter of basic
equality, justice, and capacity for citizenship).
31. Ta-Nehisi Coates, Understanding Out-of-Wedlock Births in Black America:
Revisiting the Controversial Moynihan Report, ATLANTIC (June 21, 2013),
https://www.theatlantic.com/sexes/archive/2013/06/understanding-out-of-wedlock-births-inblack-america/277084/ [https://perma.cc/V3D8-GB8Z].
32. Id. For data through 2015, see Births and Birth Rates to Unmarried Women in the
United States, Selected Years 1940–2015, NAT’L CTR. FOR HEALTH STAT.,
https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data-visualization/births-to-unmarried-women/index.htm
[https://perma.cc/FXN9-WQ44] (Sept. 14, 2017).
33. Elizabeth Wildsmith et al., Dramatic Increase in the Proportion of Births Outside of
Marriage in the United States from 1990 to 2016, CHILD TRENDS (Aug. 8, 2018),
https://www.childtrends.org/publications/dramatic-increase-in-percentage-of-births-outsidemarriage-among-whites-hispanics-and-women-with-higher-education-levels
[https://perma.cc/SJT6-4DCR] (describing how in 2016 the nonmarital birth rates for Black
female college graduates had risen to 33 percent in comparison with 7 percent for white female
college graduates and 20 percent for Latinx female college graduates).
34. See, e.g., Dana Thomson et al., Lessons from the Expanded Child Tax Credit Can
Strengthen Other Safety Net Programs, CHILD TRENDS (Aug. 4, 2021),
https://www.childtrends.org/blog/lessons-from-the-expanded-child-tax-credit-canstrengthen-other-safety-net-programs [https://perma.cc/Z6GW-G8PH].
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I. FERTILITY, RACE, AND FAMILY SUPPORT
The modern recognition of diverging demographic destinies arguably
started with the infamous 1965 Moynihan Report (“Report”).35 The Report
purported to call attention to diverging white-Black family patterns, but what
it actually discovered was a growing fertility divide associated with the first
stages of deindustrialization in the United States.
At the time of the Report, Daniel Patrick Moynihan, then a future U.S.
senator from New York whose father deserted his own family, was an
ambitious young assistant secretary of labor who wished to catch President
Lyndon Johnson’s attention.36 The Report declared: “At the heart of the
deterioration of the fabric of Negro society is the deterioration of the Negro
family. . . . [U]nless this damage [to the family] is repaired, all the effort to
end discrimination and poverty and injustice will come to little.”37
The Report proved inflammatory, as it described Black families in terms
of a “Tangle of Pathology.”38 Moynihan was accused of “blaming the
victim” for suggesting that female-headed households contributed to Black
poverty and discrimination.39 His litany of the ills of “matriarchy” rankles
to this day.
Moynihan’s statistics showed a glaring racial divide in family life.
Divorce rates did not differ by race in 1940, but Moynihan observed that, by
1964, the nonwhite divorce rate exceeded the white divorce rate by 40
percent.40 The Black nonmarital birth rate had grown from 16.8 percent to
23.6 percent, while for white people, the rate increased from 2 to 3.07
percent.41 Taken together, that meant that Black children were significantly
more likely than white children to grow up in a single-family household. The
Report acknowledged, however, that one reason for the size of the increase
was that middle-class Black families had embraced contraceptives while
poorer Black people had not. Moynihan observed that middle-class Black
people had fewer children than middle-class white people at the same time
that Black people with less education had more children at younger ages than
their white counterparts.42 The Report concluded that the Black middle class
placed “a higher premium on family stability and the conserving of family
resources than does the white middle-class family.”43 While Moynihan
35. See THE MOYNIHAN REPORT, supra note 5.
36. See JAMES T. PATTERSON, FREEDOM IS NOT ENOUGH: THE MOYNIHAN REPORT AND
AMERICA’S STRUGGLE OVER BLACK FAMILY LIFE—FROM LBJ TO OBAMA 22 (2010)
(questioning whether Moynihan sought self-promotion or policy influence).
37. THE MOYNIHAN REPORT, supra note 5, at 5.
38. That was the title of Chapter IV. Id. at 29.
39. William Ryan, Savage Discovery, 201 NATION 380, 380–84 (1965); see also Douglas
S. Massey & Robert J. Sampson, Moynihan Redux: Legacies and Lessons, 621 ANNALS AM.
ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 6, 9 (2009) (“Young black militants and newly self-aware feminists
joined in the rising tide of vilification, and Moynihan was widely pilloried not only as a racist,
but a sexist to boot.”).
40. THE MOYNIHAN REPORT, supra note 5, at 5–14.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 29.
43. Id. at 6.
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focused on statistics, the basic math is as follows: if middle-class families
were having fewer children, while poorer families were not, the percentage
of Black children raised in poor families would increase.44
Indeed, sociologist Donna Franklin, writing later in the twentieth century,
noted that taking the entire U.S. population into account, those most likely to
be childless were “[B]lack women, born in the Northeast, married at older
ages, college-educated living in urban areas, and married to professional or
white collar workers.”45 Franklin concluded that these “bifurcated” fertility
rates increased the percentage of children born to the unmarried and the
poor.46 The Moynihan Report, the controversy it generated, and the statistics
showing increasing percentages of Black children born to the poor and the
unmarried each helped to racialize the policy debates of the next half century.
These debates framed a fertility discourse that assumed that the major
problem was too many children born to the “wrong” people.47
Over the course of the 1970s, the desire to curb the fertility of unmarried
Black women shaped two major issues. The first was contraceptive access.
Remarkably, Congress passed Title X,48 a federal family planning initiative,
with a unanimous vote in the Senate and an overwhelming vote in the House.
President Richard Nixon signed it into law in 1970. Part of the reason for the
overwhelming support was that Republican voters supported the measure
even more strongly than Democrats.49 In southern states, support was often
tied to racist arguments about controlling the growth of the Black
population—indeed, Alabama was the first state to establish a tax-supported
birth control program.50 The politicians of the era, including both Presidents
Johnson and Nixon, saw population control as important to economic growth
and, at the time the legislation was adopted, women were pressing for greater
control of their reproductive lives.51 Empirical studies comparing counties
that were receiving federal funds with those that did not suggest that the
programs had their desired effect: “[The programs] reduced overall fertility
44. See generally DONNA FRANKLIN, ENSURING INEQUALITY: THE STRUCTURAL
TRANSFORMATION OF THE AMERICAN FAMILY (1997).
45. Id. at 199.
46. Id.
47. See id. at 180 (noting that “Black welfare mothers were set up as examples of a decline
in values, promiscuous sexual behavior, and a weakened commitment to work and responsible
living,” and quoting the chair of the House Ways and Means Committee as noting that welfare
reform would no longer provide rewards “for doing the wrong thing”). Of course, the
racialization of public welfare programs was not new. In a 1931 survey of mothers’ pension
programs by the U.S. Children’s Bureau, 96 percent of the recipients were white, and 3 percent
were Black (1 percent were of “other races”). See CAROLYN MOEHLING, MOTHERS’ PENSIONS
AND FEMALE HEADSHIP 6–7 (2002), https://economics.yale.edu/sites/default/files/files/
Workshops-Seminars/Labor-Public/moehling-021004.pdf [https://perma.cc/PF2E-65VK];
Joy Milligan, Subsidizing Segregation, 104 VA. L. REV. 847, 930 (2018).
48. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300–300a-6.
49. Martha J. Bailey, Fifty Years of Family Planning: New Evidence on the Long-Run
Effects of Increasing Access to Contraception, 2013 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY
341.
50. LINDA GORDON, THE MORAL PROPERTY OF WOMEN: A HISTORY OF BIRTH CONTROL
POLITICS IN AMERICA 290 (2007).
51. Id. at 289.
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rates in the counties they served by around 2 percent, and among poorer
patients (on the presumption that they were their only beneficiaries) by 20 to
30 percent within a decade.”52
During the same period, however, family support foundered. The major
federal program assisting children was Aid to Families with Dependent
Children (AFDC). Adopted during the thirties (and called Aid to Dependent
Children in that era), the program was originally intended to benefit children
“who had been deprived of parental support or care by reason of the death,
continual absence from home, or physical or mental incapacity of a parent.”53
The program treated mothers as dependent on a partner’s income to care
for their children and provided assistance so the mothers could continue to
raise their children on their own. The legislation permitted states to adopt
other eligibility requirements, and many states enacted “moral character”
requirements that excluded unmarried women from benefits.54 By the 1960s,
however, most of the requirements based on marital status had given way,
and the percentage of beneficiaries who were widows had fallen from 43
percent in 1937 to 7 percent by 1961.55 The U.S. Supreme Court, relying on
congressional intent, invalidated some of the remaining moral restrictions,
holding that “it is simply inconceivable . . . that [a state] . . . is free to
discourage immorality and illegitimacy by the device of absolute
disqualification of needy children.”56 Congress, frustrated by the Supreme
Court’s liberalization of AFDC eligibility, rising welfare rolls, and increasing
Black nonmarital birth rates, responded by beefing up child support
enforcement.57 The states, to retain their AFDC funding, had to establish
child support collection agencies that met federal standards.58 These
agencies had a mandate to establish paternity and collect payments from
supposedly “deadbeat dads,” who were seen as having deserted their
children,59 in order to reimburse public coffers for the cost of the AFDC
support.
Congress in the 1970s also recognized the other half of the changing
family picture—the need to support mothers’ workplace participation—by
enacting the Comprehensive Child Development Act (CCDA). The CCDA
would have funded a national program on childcare, where the poorest
52. Bailey, supra note 49, at 377.
53. JUNE CARBONE, FROM PARTNERS TO PARENTS 201 (2000).
54. Id.
55. Id. at 202.
56. King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 326 (1968); see also Serena Mayeri, Marital Supremacy
and the Constitution of the Nonmarital Family, 103 CALIF. L. REV. 1277, 1298 (2015) (“[T]he
substitute father regulations had been enacted . . . as part of a political program targeted
specifically at curtailing African Americans’ right to receive public assistance.”).
Subsequently, however, the Court upheld home visits in Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309
(1971), and the legitimacy of family caps in Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
57. CARBONE, supra note 53, at 157.
58. Id.
59. Ann Cammett, Deadbeat Dads & Welfare Queens: How Metaphor Shapes Poverty
Law, 34 B.C. J.L. & SOC. JUST. 233, 238 (2014) (“The image of the Deadbeat Dad also slowly
emerged as a racialized trope: an uncaring Black father unwilling to pull his weight, often
with multiple families, who expects taxpayers to carry his burden.”).
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children could receive free services and others could receive services on a
sliding scale.60 The Senate successfully passed the bill with a vote of 63–17,
with broad bipartisan support. Yet, President Nixon vetoed it, referring to
the “fiscal irresponsibility, administrative unworkability, and
family-weakening implications of the system it envisions.”61 That
effectively ended federal efforts to provide comprehensive early child
support.
Over the next twenty years, Congress and the Reagan administration
undermined support for family planning efforts,62 family support, and
women’s workplace participation, culminating with the abolition of “welfare
as we know it”—through the AFDC program—during the Clinton
administration.63 In 1996, Congress abolished the program entirely,
replacing it with Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF).64 The
shift from AFDC to TANF eliminated cash payments to needy families as an
entitlement and set time limits for benefits.65 Congress changed the program
funding to block grants, left administration to the states, and did not
guarantee benefits for the eligible. Instead, the states were given incentives
to cut expenditures, with no promise that the program would reach all of
those it was designed to help (including needy families) or that it would
provide meaningful support, such as affordable childcare, to those enrolled.66
Though TANF claimed to promote childbearing within marriage, it did more
to promote the idea that “responsible motherhood” meant not having more
children than a parent could support without government assistance than to
increase marriage rates.67
Professor Linda Gordon writes that much of the popular discussion fueling
the welfare backlash that led to the abolition of AFDC relied on “the mistaken
assumption that teenage fertility rates were rising.”68 In fact, overall teen
birth rates had steadily declined and, “contrary to widespread misimpression,

60. Deborah Dinner, The Universal Childcare Debate: Rights Mobilization, Social
Policy, and the Dynamics of Feminist Activism, 1966–1974, 28 LAW & HIST. REV. 577, 614
(2010).
61. RICHARD NIXON, PRESIDENT OF THE U.S., VETO MESSAGE—ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY
AMENDMENTS OF 1971, S. DOC. NO. 92-48, at 3 (1st Sess. 1971).
62. GORDON, supra note 50, at 336 (“Antiabortion forces in the 1980s and 1990s
consistently worked to cut public funding for birth control. During the Reagan and Bush Sr.
presidencies, Title X funding for birth control (in real dollars) fell by 72 percent and total
public funding by 27 percent, while the costs of contraception grew faster than inflation.”).
63. See, e.g., Alana Semuels, The End of Welfare as We Know It, ATLANTIC
(Apr. 1, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2016/04/the-end-of-welfare-aswe-know-it/476322/ [https://perma.cc/CE8V-CUEM]. This was something Nixon had been
unable to do. See Jill Quadagno, Race, Class, and Gender in the U.S. Welfare State: Nixon’s
Failed Family Assistance Plan, 55 AM. SOCIO. REV. 11, 15 (1990).
64. 42 U.S.C §§ 301–1397; see Andrew Hammond, Welfare and Federalism’s Peril, 92
WASH. L. REV. 1721, 1770 (2017) (describing program).
65. Hammond, supra note 64, at 1732.
66. Id.
67. See Maxine Eichner, The Privatized American Family, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 213,
257 (2017) (treating the adoption of TANF as the triumph of neoliberal ideology).
68. GORDON, supra note 50, at 347.
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the decline was steeper among blacks than among whites.”69 She observes
that two reasons contributed to the misimpression: (1) the fact that “adult
births were falling even more than teenage births” and (2) the fact that the
percentage of teen births taking place outside of marriage “had increased
from 17 percent in 1970 to 79 percent in 1998.”70 The result created alarm
about a teen pregnancy crisis attributed to a decline in the moral fabric of the
country.71
The Brookings Institution notes that misimpressions about fertility hold
with particular force for “African Americans, who are disproportionately
represented on the welfare rolls, and whose non-marital ratio went from 23.3
percent in 1960 to an alarming 69.1 percent in 1999.”72 Some social
conservatives still insist that the availability of state benefits such as AFDC
was a major factor in the change, creating incentives for unmarried women
to have more children.73
Yet, while the correlations between the generosity of welfare benefits and
the nonmarital birth rates continue to be debated, the perception that
unmarried women’s fertility rates increased because of welfare availability
is wrong. As the Brookings commentary observes, “the birth rate of
unmarried black women actually dropped by one quarter” between 1960 and
1999.74 Despite this, the percentage of nonmarital births relative to marital
births rose in large part because the birth rate of married Black women
dropped dramatically while the marriage rate declined by over 40 percent.75
Government benefits did not increase the birth rates of unmarried women, as
welfare critics like to claim.

69. Id. at 348.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 347 (stating that “alarm about teenage pregnancy and out-of-wedlock
childbearing supported the condemnation of welfare and an ‘underclass’ who allegedly lacked
good moral values and work ethic”).
72. Paul Offner, Reducing Non-Marital Births, BROOKINGS INST. (Aug. 1, 2001),
https://www.brookings.edu/research/reducing-non-marital-births/ [https://perma.cc/Y9ELXDSW].
73. Willis Krumholz, Family Breakdown and America’s Welfare System, INST. FOR FAM.
STUD. (Oct. 7, 2019), https://ifstudies.org/blog/family-breakdown-and-americas-welfaresystem [https://perma.cc/6HAZ-ENVQ] (“One contributor to family breakdown, which soon
spread to the poor and working-class white family, may have been welfare expansion.”). In a
report opposing President Biden’s welfare proposals, the Heritage Foundation stated: “Most
studies of the AFDC system before welfare reform reached similar conclusions. States with
higher monthly AFDC benefits had higher levels of out-of-wedlock births as a share of all
births within the state.” Jamie Bryan Hall & Robert Rector, Congress Should Reject Efforts to
Restore “Welfare as We Knew It” by Expanding Child Credits, HERITAGE FOUND.
(Feb. 19, 2021), https://www.heritage.org/welfare/report/congress-should-reject-effortsrestore-welfare-we-knew-it-expanding-child-credits [https://perma.cc/6RZL-2J63].
74. See Offner, supra note 72, at 2.
75. See generally id. In 1960, 30 percent of all brides gave birth within eight and a half
months of the nuptials—the shotgun marriage disguised a high rate of unmarried pregnancy.
By 1999, women generally had stopped marrying solely because of a pregnancy and poor
Black women had become much less likely to marry at all, but the rate at which unmarried
women became pregnant had fallen substantially.
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These controversies arose contemporaneously with the large-scale
movement of the mothers of young children into the workplace, the declining
employment prospects for blue collar men, and the beginnings of deep-seated
cultural divisions about women’s roles.76 The conviction that the wrong
people were having too many children for the wrong reasons contributed to
the lack of public support for greater family assistance at a time ripe for
rethinking the public infrastructure for all families.
II. FERTILITY, IMMIGRATION, AND SUPPORT FOR CHILDREN
White nationalist and anti-immigrant rhetoric in the United States often
conjures up images of an invasion of foreign migrants overwhelming our
borders.77 In 2021, Fox News’s Tucker Carlson was even using the term
“replacement theory” to insist that “the Democratic Party is trying to replace
the current electorate, the voters now casting ballots, with new people, more
obedient voters from the third world.”78 These perceptions increase support
for white nationalist politicians,79 and they contribute to negative perceptions
of public schools80 and social programs.81
One of the factors fueling these sentiments is the perception that
immigration is out of control. Surveys in France, Germany, Italy, Sweden,
the United Kingdom, and the United States find that the share of immigrants
is perceived to be “at least twice as high as it actually is.”82 More
sophisticated studies indicate that perceptions of immigration are tied to a
combination of immigrants’ places of origin (e.g., more favorable views of
76. CAHN & CARBONE, supra note 18, at 39–45, 51 (describing women’s greater economic
independence, changing family roles, and moral backlash).
77. See, e.g., Christina Iturralde, Rhetoric and Violence: Understanding Incidents of Hate
Against Latinos, 12 N.Y.C. L. REV. 417, 421 (2009) (“It is particularly troubling that many of
their published reports use pictures and images of Latinos crossing the border and the border
itself, and claim an invasion by immigrants from Latin America.”); David Frum, If Liberals
Won’t Enforce Borders, Fascists Will, ATLANTIC (Apr. 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/
magazine/archive/2019/04/david-frum-how-much-immigration-is-too-much/583252/
[https://perma.cc/QAA4-9MTB] (discussing President Trump’s manipulation of the imagery
of the caravan of migrants approaching the Mexican border in 2018).
78. What Is White Replacement Theory?: Explaining the White Supremacist Rhetoric,
NPR (Sept. 26, 2021, 7:54 AM), https://www.npr.org/2021/09/26/1040756471/what-is-whitereplacement-theory-explaining-the-white-supremacist-rhetoric
[https://perma.cc/9T2UFVYT].
79. Empirical studies produce mixed results. See SERGEI GURIEV & ELIAS PAPAIOANNOU,
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF POPULISM 67 (2020), https://www.hks.harvard.edu/sites/default/
files/centers/mrcbg/programs/senior.fellows/20-21/populism_oct2020.pdf
[https://perma.cc/AX6W-GX9Z].
80. According to a 2015 report, 41 percent of the public indicated that increased
immigration has made their schools worse. PEW RSCH. CTR., MODERN IMMIGRATION WAVE
BRINGS 59 MILLION TO U.S., DRIVING POPULATION GROWTH AND CHANGE THROUGH 2065, at
58 (2015), https://www.pewresearch.org/hispanic/wp-content/uploads/sites/5/2015/09/201509-28_modern-immigration-wave_REPORT.pdf [https://perma.cc/9A2C-8NCW].
81. In 2015, 41 percent responded that immigrants are a burden because “they take our
jobs, housing and health care,” though this is a reduction from 1994, when 63 percent said
immigrants were a burden. Id. at 54.
82. Alberto Alesina et al., Immigration and Redistribution 12 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ.
Rsch., Working Paper No. 24,733, 2019).
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Asian and European immigrants than of Latinx immigrants),83 the speed of
immigration,84 and a perception of loss of ground, economically and
demographically, by the native-born population. A nativist anti-immigrant
group, for example, warned that the United States is “overpopulated” and
that the three causes of the “biggest U.S. population boom ever” are low
“native fertility,” “immigration,” and high “immigrant fertility.”85 Now,
linking low native fertility with “overpopulation” belies the group’s true fear:
“overpopulation” by the wrong people.86 Researchers have explored the link
between these three factors in fueling racial anxiety, nativist sentiment, and
populist politics. The Wall Street Journal, for example, conducted a survey
linking support for President Donald Trump in 2016 to communities
experiencing rapid diversification, particularly in the Midwest87: voters said
they are “worried illegal immigrants are crowding schools and unfairly
tapping public assistance, problems they believe Mr. Trump would fix.”88
The role of immigration differs regionally, and the regional differences
may cloak national trends. But in many localities, the change in school
population becomes symbolic of this change. In Arcadia, Wisconsin, for
example, the Latinx portion of the population went from 3 percent to 35
percent between 2000 and 2014. During the same period, one of the town’s
elementary schools went from almost all white to 73 percent Latinx.89 “We
were hit like a tsunami,” said Arcadia Elementary School Principal Paul
Halverson, describing the change in his town of 3000 people.90 Similarly,
following Hurricane Katrina, the Latinx population of New Orleans grew
dramatically at a time when the city’s overall population had fallen to 80
percent of its pre-storm population. At one point, then Mayor Ray Nagin
asked business leaders how to prevent the city from being “overrun by
Mexican workers.”91 And by 2013, Jefferson Parish Public Schools

83. PEW RSCH. CTR., supra note 80, at 14.
84. Olga Khazan, A Surprising Reason to Worry About Low Birth Rates, ATLANTIC (May
26, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2018/05/a-surprising-reason-to-worryabout-low-birth-rates/561308/ [https://perma.cc/88RD-RXE8]; see also Janet Adamy & Paul
Overberg, Places Most Unsettled by Rapid Demographic Change Are Drawn to Donald
Trump, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 1, 2016), https://www.wsj.com/articles/places-most-unsettled-byrapid-demographic-change-go-for-donald-trump-1478010940
[https://perma.cc/MC5TL28L] (finding that while large cities received the largest number of immigrants, those cities
were already diverse and it was the areas of the country that diversified most rapidly and
recently that showed the largest shifts toward populism).
85. Iturralde, supra note 77, at 422.
86. The Southern Poverty Law Center describes the group, NumbersUSA, as a racist
anti-immigrant advocacy organization that opposes both legal and illegal immigration. Heidi
Beirich, The Nativist Lobby: Three Faces of Intolerance, S. POVERTY L. CTR. (Feb. 1, 2009),
https://www.splcenter.org/20090131/nativist-lobby-three-faces-intolerance
[https://perma.cc/8Z37-WCTQ].
87. Adamy & Overberg, supra note 84.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Andy Grimm, Hispanic Immigration Post-Katrina Finding Permanent Roots in Metro
New Orleans, TIMES-PICAYUNE/NEW ORLEANS ADVOC. (July 18, 2019, 2:11 PM),
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experienced a 40 percent increase in English as a Second Language
learners.92
Throughout American history, these types of changes have tended to
undermine support for public spending. Professors Claudia Goldin and
Lawrence Katz found, in their history of American education, that “[g]reater
social cohesion, intergenerational propinquity, and community stability”
increased support for publicly funded education.93 They explained that
smaller and more homogeneous communities with more stable populations,
with multiple generations living nearby, were more likely to vote for the taxes
necessary to support public schools.94
In recent years, the focus on schools overstates the effect of immigration.
Latinx immigration peaked in 2005 and has fallen steadily since then.95 The
Latinx population is still growing as a percentage of the American
population, but “births overtook immigration as the main driver of [Latinx]
population growth after 2000”96 and the significance of births over
immigration accelerated after 2010.97
Latinx fertility was thus an important factor in the perception of an
immigration “tsunami.” In the period from the mid-1980s to the early 2000s,
Latinx birth rates were not only higher than white birth rates, but they
increased over the course of the 1990s, averaging over three births per
woman at a time when white birth rates had fallen below replacement level
fertility.98 In California, for example, more than half of all schoolchildren
were Latinx in 2010, even though the Latinx population was a little less than
a third of the state’s adults.99 For the United States as a whole, approximately
a quarter of all children under seventeen are Latinx, in comparison with 18

https://www.nola.com/news/article_ddb9794b-8bd7-5be8-8d55-6669024d3cb3.html
[https://perma.cc/N7YX-H5NR].
92. Id.
93. CLAUDIA GOLDIN & LAWRENCE F. KATZ, THE RACE BETWEEN EDUCATION AND
TECHNOLOGY 209 (2008).
94. Id.; see also Bradley W. Joondeph, The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly: An Empirical
Analysis of Litigation-Prompted School Finance Reform, 35 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 763, 822–
23 (1995) (arguing that school finance reform of the type prompted by Serrano v. Priest, 487
P.2d 1241 (Cal. 1971), reduced public support for school funding).
95. Jens Manuel Krogstad & Mark Hugo Lopez, Hispanic Nativity Shift: U.S. Births
Drive Population Growth as Immigration Stalls, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Apr. 29, 2015),
https://www.pewresearch.org/hispanic/2014/04/29/hispanic-nativity-shift/
[https://perma.cc/VUL5-TBHY].
96. Id.
97. Jens Manuel Krogstad & Luis Noe-Bustamante, Key Facts About U.S. Latinos for
National Hispanic Heritage Month, PEW. RSCH. CTR. (Sept. 9, 2021),
https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2021/09/09/key-facts-about-u-s-latinos-for-nationalhispanic-heritage-month/ [https://perma.cc/73XT-548C].
98. Lyman Stone, Babies vs. Immigrants: Must We Really Choose?, INST. FOR FAM. STUD.
(Nov. 26, 2019), https://ifstudies.org/blog/babies-vs-immigrants-must-we-really-choose
[https://perma.cc/GF5Z-98VK].
99. Carol Morello & Dan Balz, More than Half of California Children Latino, Census
Shows, WASH. POST (Mar. 8, 2011), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/more-than-halfof-california-children-latino-census-shows/2011/03/08/ABqwuSP_story.html
[https://perma.cc/R36Z-W4G3].
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percent of adults.100 Latinx Americans’ younger average ages together with
higher overall fertility rates and rapid increases in areas of high labor demand
have contributed to the perception of an immigration tsunami and to white
reluctance to fund expanded investment in education and early childhood.
That may be changing, however. Latinx immigration has fallen steadily,
and Asian people now constitute the largest group of immigrants coming to
the United States.101 Moreover, while overall U.S. fertility fell by 15 percent
between 2007 and 2018, Latinx fertility fell by 31 percent.102 Even with less
Latinx immigration and converging fertility rates, however, the majority of
the population in the United States is expected to be Latinx by 2045.103 In
the meantime, American support for a more diverse future has increased.104
III. THE SECOND DEMOGRAPHIC TRANSITION AND CONVERGING
DESTINIES
Sociologists and demographers have focused attention on fertility in quite
different ways from the popular discourse, defining a first and “second
demographic transition (SDT).”105 The first demographic transition, which
was associated with industrialization, took place in the United States
beginning in the 1840s through the early 1900s, when “mortality and fertility
declined and investment in child quality grew” in the United States and other
western industrialized countries.106 The SDT, associated with the rise of the
information age and greater employment opportunities for women, predicts
“sustained sub-replacement fertility, a multitude of living arrangements other
than marriage, and the disconnection between marriage and procreation.”107
In the United States, two questions arise regarding the SDT: (1) does it
apply to the United States at all, and (2) to the extent it does, does it contribute
to growing family-based inequality? The recent drop in fertility in the United

100. Child Population, by Race/Ethnicity, KIDSDATA, https://www.kidsdata.org/topic/33/
child-population-race/pie#fmt=144&loc=2,1&tf=110&ch=7,11,726,10,72,9,73,87&pdist=73
[https://perma.cc/RVF8-Y2UD] (last visited Apr. 2, 2022).
101. Stone, supra note 98.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Abby Budiman, Americans Are More Positive About the Long-Term Rise in U.S.
Racial and Ethnic Diversity than in 2016, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Oct. 1, 2020),
https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/10/01/americans-are-more-positive-about-thelong-term-rise-in-u-s-racial-and-ethnic-diversity-than-in-2016/
[https://perma.cc/LP7GKD3B] (reporting that Pew’s public opinion polling shows that the share of Americans who
view the long-term growth of racial and ethnic diversity as good for the United States is higher
in 2020 than it was in 2016).
105. Ron Lesthaeghe and Dirk Jan van de Kaa originated the term in 1986. Ron Lesthaeghe
& Dirk Jan van de Kaa, Twee demografische transities?, in BEVOLKING: GROEI EN KRIMP 9
(1986). The most cited statement of the concept came a year later. Dirk Jan van de Kaa,
Europe’s Second Demographic Transition, POPULATION BULL., Mar. 1987, at 3. For a later
summary, see Lesthaeghe, supra note 13, at 18,112–15.
106. Sara McLanahan, Diverging Destinies: How Children Are Faring Under the Second
Demographic Transition, 41 DEMOGRAPHY 607, 607 (2004).
107. Batool Zaidi & S. Philip Morgan, The Second Demographic Transition Theory: A
Review and Appraisal, 43 ANN. REV. SOC. 473, 474 (2017).
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States answers the first question—U.S. fertility patterns now look like
Northern Europe’s, though the United States varies internally with the more
prosperous and secular regions corresponding most closely to SDT
patterns.108
Sociologist Sara McLanahan posed the second question—whether the
SDT explained “diverging destinies”; she associated the emergence of
class-based differences in family form with the SDT in 2004.109 McLanahan
focused on four factors underlying the new system: “feminism, new birth
control technologies, changes in the labor market, and welfare policies.”110
In short, educated women took advantage of new employment opportunities
by using contraception to plan family formation, investing more in their own
earning capacity, and forging more cooperative and reciprocal parenting
partnerships that provided a foundation for success in the new economy.111
In the meantime, the new system, which facilitated the upper middle class’s
hyperinvestment in children, remained beyond the reach of a large part of the
population.112
Indeed, much of what McLanahan describes is a product not just of lower
fertility or differences in marriage and divorce rates, but in the timing and
control of fertility. For college graduates, the median age of a mother at first
birth has gone up steadily and, by 2010, was close to age thirty.113 In
contrast, for high school graduates who do not complete college, the average
age of first birth declined between 1990 and 2010, remaining under the age
of twenty-five.114 The differences in income associated with a delay in
marriage are substantial for college graduates, as the later the age of
marriage, the higher women’s incomes.115 For those who do not graduate
from college, by contrast, the increases in income associated with a delay in
family formation are more modest.116
108. Compare Ron J. Lesthaeghe & Lisa Neidert, The Second Demographic Transition in
the United States: Exception or Textbook Example?, 32 POPULATION & DEV. REV. 669, 670
(2006) (describing how American fertility rates were higher than European rates in 2006),
with Stone, supra note 20 (showing that today’s American fertility rates are similar to those
Lesthaeghe and Neidert associated with the second demographic transition).
109. McLanahan, supra note 106, at 607 (referring to diverging destinies).
110. Id. at 617.
111. We described the emergence of this new middle class family strategy as “blue
marriage.” CAHN & CARBONE, supra note 18, at 1–2, 121–22. In contrast, some European
commentators present a more negative view of the SDT, associating the “autonomy of
women” with “the demise of Germany as a vibrant nation, by arguing that giving women
autonomy and allowing them to choose whether to have children or not and at what age, has
led to sub-replacement fertility.” José Brunner, Liberal Laws v. the Law of Large Numbers, or
How Demographic Rhetoric Arouses Anxiety (in Germany), 2 LAW & ETHICS HUM. RTS. 1, 3
(2008).
112. See JUNE CARBONE & NAOMI CAHN, MARRIAGE MARKETS 118–22 (2014).
113. See HYMOWITZ ET AL., supra note 15, at 8 fig.IIA. The median age of first marriage
and first birth has continued to increase for college graduates. For those with less education,
the median age of marriage has continued to go up, but the median age of first birth levels off
after 1990 and now occurs at a younger age than the median age of marriage. Id. at 8.
114. Id. at 8 fig.II.C.
115. Id. at 15 fig.7.
116. Id.
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The issue of timing is not merely a matter of career investment, however.
It also involves contraceptive usage. The Guttmacher Institute reports, for
example, that between 1990 and 2008, the unintended pregnancy rate grew
by approximately 40 percent for women below the poverty line, while the
rate was cut in half for those with incomes 200 percent or more above the
poverty line.117 During this period, effective contraceptive use became much
more systematic, with family doctors prescribing the birth control pill to
adolescents not just to prevent pregnancy, but also to control acne and
menstrual cramps.118 Moreover, more effective—albeit controversial—birth
control methods became available.119 For those with regular health-care
access, contraceptive use became more likely to precede the beginning of
sexual activity.
Ethnographic work—asking young women to keep weekly diaries
describing their relationships—sheds further light on pregnancies,
suggesting that the characteristics of the male partners, rather than the
woman’s characteristics, are major factors in determining which women
become pregnant.120 This work demonstrates that more violent men are more
likely to father children and less likely to be good bets for continuing
involvement with the resulting children than less violent partners.121 In
addition, such partners often undermine birth control use.
These findings indicate that some of the regional and class disparities that
arose in the United States over family formation correlate with the adoption
of a new system: investment in women’s as well as men’s income-earning
capacity, delay in family formation to realize the benefits of that investment,
and more companionate rather than hierarchical relationships dependent on
reciprocity and trust.122 All of these factors depend on a framework that
systematizes women’s control of their own sexuality early in life and
provides support for later child-rearing when prospective parents are better
able to assume responsibility for child-rearing. This new system has become
117. See GUTTMACHER INST., supra note 2.
118. Traci C. Johnson, Birth Control: Benefits Beyond Pregnancy Prevention, WEBMD
(Oct. 14, 2020), http://www.webmd.com/sex/birth-control/features/other-reasons-to-take-thepill [https://perma.cc/G5J9-S483].
119. COMM. ON ADOLESCENT HEALTH CARE, AM. COLL. OF OBSTETRICIANS &
GYNECOLOGISTS, COUNSELING ADOLESCENTS ABOUT CONTRACEPTION
(2017),
https://www.acog.org/-/media/project/acog/acogorg/clinical/files/committee-opinion/articles/
2017/08/counseling-adolescents-about-contraception.pdf
[https://perma.cc/654N-UA9Y]
(discussing effectiveness of long-acting-reversible contraceptives (LARCs)). LARCs are
controversial because of claims of coercion in promoting their use. See, e.g., Olivia Cappello,
Powerful Contraception, Complicated Programs: Preventing Coercive Promotion of
Long-Acting Reversible Contraceptives, 24 GUTTMACHER POL’Y REV. 36 (2021),
https://www.guttmacher.org/sites/default/files/article_files/gpr2403621.pdf
[https://perma.cc/TTE2-LJVQ].
120. See generally Jennifer S. Barber et al., The Relationship Context of Young
Pregnancies, 35 LAW & INEQ. 175 (2017); Jennifer S. Barber et al., The Dynamics of Intimate
Partner Violence and the Risk of Pregnancy During the Transition to Adulthood, 83 AM.
SOCIO. REV. 1020 (2018) [hereinafter The Dynamics of Intimate Partner Violence].
121. The Dynamics of Intimate Partner Violence, supra note 120, at 1043.
122. CAHN & CARBONE, supra note 18, at 110–18 (describing the new egalitarian
relationship terms).
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part of the emerging upper-middle-class family system; it has also been
beyond the reach of a large share of the population—in part because of the
failure to provide systematic access to birth control, good employment, and
investment in children.
IV. DO CONVERGING FERTILITY RATES REFLECT A CONVERGENCE IN
FAMILY VALUES?
Today, the larger question is whether the convergence in fertility patterns,
particularly by race, class, and ethnicity, involves a greater embrace of the
values underlying what we have termed “blue families”—that is, a
postponement in family formation that corresponds to women’s greater
workforce participation and that is designed to facilitate greater investment
in children.
In 2021, the media focused on the U.S. birth rate, which fell to its lowest
level ever.123 The completed fertility rate, which measures the average
number of children that a woman will have, tells a slightly different story. In
1800, the average woman would have had seven children; it dropped to two
children in 1940, rose to 3.5 in 1960, and then dropped to its lowest of 1.77
in 1980, which is comparable to today’s birth rate.124 And fewer women,
regardless of educational level, are having children as teens or in their early
twenties.125 As recently as twenty-five years ago, women with bachelor’s
degrees or more were less likely to become mothers; the gap in birth rates by
the education level of the mother is closing.126 Moreover, even newer
research has found that the nonmarital birth rate for college grads has
increased, projecting that 18 to 27 percent of first births to college-educated
women in their thirties will be to nonmarital mothers,127 though many of
these births are to women either pre-college or during college.128
123. See, e.g., Sabrina Tavernise, The U.S. Birthrate Has Dropped Again. The Pandemic
May Be Accelerating the Decline, N.Y. TIMES (May 5, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/
05/05/us/us-birthrate-falls-covid.html [https://perma.cc/ZN4P-P44N]; Leslie Root, Opinion,
Why We Shouldn’t Worry About Falling Birthrates, WASH. POST (June 2, 2021),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2021/06/02/why-we-shouldnt-worry-aboutfalling-birthrates/ [https://perma.cc/U3NW-GXLL]; see also BRADY E. HAMILTON ET AL.,
CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, BIRTHS: PROVISIONAL DATA FOR 2020, at 2
(2021), https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/vsrr/vsrr012-508.pdf [https://perma.cc/GB7N-9PQU]
(providing long-term U.S. birth rate data).
124. Aaron O’Neill, Total Fertility Rate of the United States from 1800 to 2020, STATISTA
(Feb. 17, 2021), https://www.statista.com/statistics/1033027/fertility-rate-us-1800-2020/
[https://perma.cc/R2TB-R6KF].
125. See Barroso, supra note 21.
126. Id.
127. See Andrew J. Cherlin, Rising Nonmarital First Childbearing Among
College-Educated Women: Evidence from Three National Studies, PROC. OF THE NAT’L ACAD.
OF SCIS. OF THE U.S. (Sept. 7, 2021), https://www.pnas.org/content/118/37/e2109016118
[https://perma.cc/EJ2H-2AQZ].
128. Id. app. fig.S2. This study defines the group of “college graduates” to include both
women who had graduated from college before the birth of the child and women who graduate
from college after a child’s birth. The group of women who attend college later in life tends
to be systematically different from the group of women who attend college directly after high
school. See JACQUELINE E. KING, AM. COUNCIL ON EDUC. CTR. FOR POL’Y ANALYSIS, GENDER
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Behind the decline is a complicated story of immigration, race,
contraception, and economics. Foreign-born women—whether Hispanic,
Black, white, or Asian—have higher birth rates than U.S.-born women.129 In
2000, the foreign-born Hispanic birth rate was 109.7 babies per 1000 women
who are between fifteen and forty-four years old, the highest of all
foreign-born women; U.S.-born Hispanics also had the highest birth rates,
but their rate was 77.4 per 1000 women. Foreign-born Hispanic births
accounted for almost 60 percent of the births of all immigrants. By 2017, the
Hispanic birth rate for both immigrants and American-born mothers had
fallen by more than 20 percent.130
As for contraception, one place to see the impact is the teenage birth rate,
which has declined from eighty-nine per 1000 teens in 1960 to approximately
forty per 1000 in 2005131 to a record low of 16.6 in 2019.132 The decline
reflects both a decrease in sex for girls and women between the ages of fifteen
and nineteen and an increase in contraceptive use in that age group.133
Indeed, just from 2005 to 2013, the usage rate of long-acting reversible
contraceptives for teens seeking Title X services increased from 0.4 percent
to 7.1 percent.134 Births to women in their twenties also fell by 28 percent
from 2007 to 2021.135 And the unintended pregnancy rate has been
declining, particularly for poor women.136 The Affordable Care Act,137
which classified contraception with other preventive care services, is

EQUITY IN HIGHER EDUCATION: 2010 (2010). White people and Asian people, for example,
are more likely than Black people to attend college at younger ages. See id. at 9 tbl.1.
129. Livingston, supra note 8.
130. Id.
131. See Bianca Faccio & Heather Wasik, Teen Birth Rates Are Declining, but the Job Is
Not Done, CHILD TRENDS (May 5, 2015), https://www.childtrends.org/indicators/teen-births
[https://perma.cc/C863-EX5G].
132. See HAMILTON, supra note 21, at 2; JOYCE A. MARTIN ET AL., CTRS. FOR DISEASE
CONTROL & PREVENTION, BIRTHS: FINAL DATA FOR 2019, at 48 (2021), https://www.cdc.gov/
nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr70/nvsr70-02-508.pdf [https://perma.cc/8UWE-489L]. To be sure, teens
are also less likely to be married.
133. Gretchen Livingston & Deja Thomas, Why Is the Teen Birth Rate Falling?, PEW RSCH.
CTR. (Aug. 2, 2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/08/02/why-is-the-teenbirth-rate-falling/ [https://perma.cc/PD84-BKXA].
134. Lisa Romero et al., Vital Signs: Trends in Use of Long-Acting Reversible
Contraception Among Teens Aged 15–19 Years Seeking Contraceptive Services—United
States, 2005–2013, 64 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 363 (2015),
https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/pdf/wk/mm6413.pdf [https://perma.cc/JS7Q-8UL9].
135. Sabrina Tavernise et al., Why American Women Everywhere Are Delaying
Motherhood, N.Y. TIMES (June 16, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/16/us/
declining-birthrate-motherhood.html [https://perma.cc/33AX-7BX6].
136. See Courtney Vinopal, The U.S. Birth Rate Began Dropping Years Before the
Pandemic. Here’s Why, PBS (May 13, 2021), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/nation/how-thecoronavirus-pandemic-has-changed-the-way-americans-think-about-pregnancy
[https://perma.cc/B2ZQ-VTYL]; Lawrence B. Finer & Mia R. Zolna, Declines in Unintended
Pregnancy in the United States, 2008–2011, 374 NEW ENG. J. MED. 843, 847 fig.1 (2016),
https://www.nejm.org/doi/pdf/10.1056/NEJMsa1506575?articleTools=true [https://perma.cc/
8LDK-83LR] (showing a drop from 51 percent to 45 percent from 2008 to 2011).
137. Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of the U.S.C.).
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associated with lower birth rates and higher rates of women filling
prescriptions for birth control.138
These rates correspond with economic vitality. In larger urban counties
with the highest increases in jobs and population since the 2008–2009
recession, birth rates have fallen twice as quickly as in the smaller, rural
counties that have had a slower recovery.139 Yet, due to numerous factors,
interpreting birth rates is complex.140 Women may be postponing
childbearing both because of greater economic stress and because of greater
investment in future opportunities. The New York Times reported:
In more than two dozen interviews with young women in Phoenix and
Denver, some said they felt they could not afford a baby. They cited the
costs of childcare and housing, and sometimes student debt. Many also
said they wanted to get their careers set first and expressed satisfaction that
they were exerting control over their fertility—and their lives—in a way
their mothers had not.141

In addition, in countries where women feel they have to choose between
work and family, fertility levels appear to be lower.142 Conversely, policies
that increase economic well-being appear to be correlated with higher
fertility rates.143
McLanahan argued that both rich and poor children benefited from the first
demographic transition’s increased investment in children144—in contrast
138. Clara Murez, Obamacare’s Birth Control Coverage May Have Reduced Unplanned
Pregnancies, U.S. NEWS (Nov. 10, 2020, 8:39 AM), https://www.usnews.com/news/healthnews/articles/2020-11-10/obamacares-birth-control-coverage-may-have-reduced-unplannedpregnancies [https://perma.cc/F8M4-KMK2].
139. Tavernise et al., supra note 135.
140. Even for the most highly educated, there may be diverging rates of dates of first birth
by race. See Natalie Nitsche & Hannah Brückner, High and Higher: Fertility of Black and
White Women with College and Postgraduate Education in the United States 2 (Vienna Inst.
of Demography, Working Paper No. 07, 2018), https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/
207050/1/1025574591.pdf [https://perma.cc/5XR8-U2BZ].
141. Tavernise et al., supra note 135.
142. LAURIE DEROSE & LYMAN STONE, INST. FOR FAM. STUD., MORE WORK, FEWER
BABIES: WHAT DOES WORKISM HAVE TO DO WITH FALLING FERTILITY? 7 (2021),
https://ifstudies.org/ifs-admin/resources/reports/ifs-workismreport-final-031721.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8FCD-WG79]; Lyman Stone & Laurie DeRose, What Workism Is Doing to
Parents, ATLANTIC (May 5, 2021), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2021/05/whatworkism-doing-would-be-parents/618789/ [https://perma.cc/4JKZ-TE4C]. The study found
overall that, in countries where individuals valued family over work, fertility tended to be
higher. It also found that women who both embraced a traditional gender ideology and valued
family over work had the most children. DEROSE & STONE, supra, at 14 fig.7.
143. See, e.g., Fergus Cumming & Lisa Dettling, Monetary Policy and Birth Rates: The
Effect of Mortgage Rate Pass-Through on Fertility (Bank of Eng., Working Paper No. 835,
2019), https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/-/media/boe/files/working-paper/2019/monetarypolicy-and-birth-rates-the-effect-of-mortgage-rate-pass-through-on-fertility.pdf
[https://perma.cc/L7QH-UH8Z] (finding that “a 1 percentage point reduction in the monetary
policy rate—which decreased mortgage payments by 12 percent on average—leads to a 5
percent increase in the birth rate among families”); Ramesh Ponnuru, Opinion, Can Americans
Be Encouraged to Have More Babies?: Make the U.S. More Livable, BLOOMBERG
(May 11, 2021, 9:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2021-05-11/canamericans-be-encouraged-to-have-more-babies [https://perma.cc/ZC5H-QBJB].
144. Cumming & Dettling, supra note 143, at 60.
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with the SDT, which she argued increased inequality. What McLanahan did
not explain is that it took more than a century for the benefits of the first
demographic transition to spread from the upper middle class to the rest of
society and that this only happened because of the state’s role in promoting
unionization and benefits programs. Expanded unionization raised the male
family wage, which allowed the working class to realize the benefits of
greater maternal investment in children, and expanded workplace regulations
reduced mortality.145 State provision of unemployment compensation,
Social Security, disability, Medicare and Medicaid, and other benefits offset
the instability and insecurity of wage labor.146
CONCLUSION
The information age is effecting a transformation of the family on a scale
comparable to the changes associated with industrialization.147 Scholars
have mapped the global reductions in fertility, a leading indicator of the
changes,148 but have not to date agreed on the causes or the broader societal
implications.149 Instead, family scholars have posited that declining fertility
reflects a cultural shift toward “self-actualization”150 and that fertility falls
because of “workism.”151 Yet, the critics attributing declining fertility to
these causes have failed to explain the increasing convergence in fertility
rates or their interaction with the economic changes.
The fertility declines in the early years of both the first and second
demographic transitions were associated with greater investment in children,
as the upper middle classes of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries dealt
with economic changes by adopting new family strategies that both limited
the number of children and gave their children advantages in more

145. See Naomi Cahn & June Carbone, Uncoupling, 53 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1, 23 (2020)
(describing the growth of unionization and the corresponding increase in job security). For a
description of the high rates of workplace injuries preceding the union era, see id. at 9, 12
n.70.
146. See id. at 37–38; June Carbone, The Fight to Expand Education—Two Centuries
Apart, 71 FLA. L. REV. 164, 167 (2019) (describing the expansion of free secondary education
during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries).
147. Cahn & Carbone, supra note 145, at 26–27 (describing how just “as the industrial age
destabilized the sources of stability in the agrarian age, so too has the information age
dismantled the family wage [system] of the industrial era” replacing it with a new system that
rewards those who can marshall the resources to invest in children).
148. Zaidi & Morgan, supra note 107, at 474.
149. See, e.g., June Carbone, A Consumer Guide to Empirical Family Law, 95 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1593, 1616 (2020) (observing that the “problem with both the SDT and the
European feminists’ response is that it does little to explain the class-based family divisions
in the United States”).
150. Id. at 1597 (summarizing literature).
151. See DEROSE & STONE, supra note 142, at 3. DeRose and Stone describe “workism”
as the “rise of ‘work-focused’ value sets and life courses” that mean “that achieving
work-family balance isn’t just about employment norms adjusting to the growing complexity
of individual aspirations. It can also mean that many men and women find their preferred
balance to be more work and less family.” Id.
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competitive economies.152 These strategies, which were beyond the reach of
the working class, produced greater inequality as greater investment in
children increased adult opportunities. Reductions in fertility in both eras
were associated with changes in adult roles that contributed to wealth
acquisition, more intensive parental engagement with children, more
effective reproductive control, greater educational opportunities from early
childhood onward, and greater assistance in gaining the experience, training,
and retraining that make adults “employable.”153
Family support needs to be rebuilt on the terms of the new economy, an
economy that depends on women’s—as well as men’s—market labor and
that requires a new infrastructure to extend the benefits of the new system to
all families. This new system rests on a series of elements. First, family
planning is an imperative. It is a system that is most effective when
contraceptive information and access is systematically made available to
teens before they become sexually active. The Affordable Care Act has
helped address contraceptive affordability; universal access and
encouragement is the next step, and that step requires stronger protection
from intimate partner violence.
Second, the nuclear family is no longer a necessary or sufficient measure
to protect childhood well-being. Parents, acting on their own, cannot solve
the problem of economic—and childhood—inequality.154
Third, a critical period for investment is early childhood.155 Well-off
parents have been able to realize the advantages of the SDT by intensive
cultivation of their children, which requires increased parenting in the first
year of life, affordable high-quality early childhood care, and universal
pre-K.156 Universal early childhood education is today’s equivalent of free
secondary education in the nineteenth century.157
Fourth, support for the transition to adulthood requires rethinking the
pipelines to employment opportunities. Adults who finish school can no
longer depend on completing their educations and walking into jobs that

152. Compare MARY P. RYAN, CRADLE OF THE MIDDLE CLASS: THE FAMILY IN ONEIDA
COUNTY, NEW YORK, 1790–1865, at 184–85 (1981) (describing how middle-class status
required greater moral instruction and supervision of the young in nineteenth-century Utica,
New York), with CAHN & CARBONE, supra note 18, at 1–2, 121–22 (describing the blue family
model as an upper-middle-class adaption to the new economy).
153. Cahn & Carbone, supra note 145, at 34–36 (describing how “employability” has
replaced employment as a necessary element in family security). “Employability” refers to
the ability not just to have a job, but acquisition of the skills and experience to be able to get
the next job if the first one does not work out. Id.
154. See Solangel Maldonado, Parental Social Capital and Educational Inequality, 90
FORDHAM L. REV. 2599 (2022).
155. Sneha Elango et al., Early Childhood Education 6 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch.,
Working Paper No. 21,766, 2015), http://www.nber.org/papers/w21766.pdf [https://perma.cc/
ERS8-E7CN].
156. See Maxine Eichner, COVID-19 and the Perils of Free-Market Parenting: Why It Is
Past Time for the United States to Install Government Supports for Families, 90 FORDHAM L.
REV. 2509 (2022).
157. CARBONE, supra note 53, at 164.
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provide lifetime tenure. Instead, “employability” requires the ability to gain
new skills, return to school, and if necessary, move to new locations.158
Fifth, providing for the elderly. Elder care, like childcare, remains part of
a gendered assignment of family responsibilities. Today, it is increasingly
commercialized, dependent on immigrant caretakers, and unaffordable for
many.159 Greater systematic provision of care is needed.
Taken together, these and other measures require providing a new family
infrastructure built on the new model that we have termed “blue” and that
others have called the SDT. It is important to recognize that this model is
not just about the changing fertility rates—nor is it solely caused by, or
concerned with, the changing roles of women—though those changes
certainly are a necessary part of gender justice. Instead, it is about a
fundamental change in the economic organization of society, which has
eliminated many well-paid routine jobs and increased the rewards, both
individual and societal, for greater human capital investment. These
changes, by increasing the demand and compensation for many services
women have traditionally performed, have increased the opportunity costs
involved in providing childcare and thus contribute to falling fertility. The
only solution that can extend the benefits of the new system to a larger
portion of society requires rethinking the infrastructure underlying
investment in children. The future of our society depends on it.

158. Cahn & Carbone, supra note 145, at 34–37.
159. See The Ezra Klein Show, Every 8 Seconds, An American Turns 65. How Do We Care
for Everyone?, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 7, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/12/07/opinion/
ezra-klein-podcast-ai-jen-poo.html [https://perma.cc/F5VV-K444]; Naomi Cahn, Clare
Huntington & Elizabeth Scott, Family Law for the One-Hundred-Year Life, YALE L.J.
(forthcoming 2023), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4038989 [https://
perma.cc/9SA3-5HYG].

